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Abstract In previous studies claiming to demonstrate
that great apes understand the goals of others, the apes
could potentially have been using subtle behavioral cues
present during the test to succeed. In the current studies, we
ruled out the use of such cues by making the behavior of
the experimenter identical in the test phase of both the
experimental and control conditions; the only difference
was the preceding ‘‘context.’’ In the first study, apes
interpreted a human’s ambiguous action as having the
underlying goal of opening a box, or not, based on that
human’s previous actions with similar boxes. In the second
study, chimpanzees learned that when a human stood up
she was going to go get food for them, but when a novel,
unexpected event happened, they changed their expecta-
tion—presumably based on their understanding that this
new event led the human to change her goal. These studies
suggest that great apes do not need concurrent behavioral
cues to infer others’ goals, but can do so from a variety of
different types of cues—even cues displaced in time.
Keywords Intentional action  Goal understanding 
Nonhuman primates  Chimpanzees
Introduction
Organisms can interact with others in much more effective
ways if they understand what those others are doing in
terms of their underlying goals, that is, in terms of the
changes of state in the environment they are trying to bring
about. Understanding actions in terms of goals enables an
observer to predict an actor’s actions not just in recurrent
situations, when the same situational and behavioral cues
are again present, but also more flexibly in many novel
situations (Tomasello and Call 1997).
There are currently four sets of experiments claiming
that chimpanzees understand the actions of others in terms
of their underlying goals. All of these studies test great
apes’ understanding of accidents and failed attempts—
since these are the cases in which what the actor does
overtly in behavior does not match his underlying goal (the
question being whether subjects then respond to the
behavior or to the goal). First, in an object choice para-
digm, Call and Tomasello (1998) taught chimpanzees and
orangutans that a marker on top of one of three containers
indicated that hidden food was inside that container. Then,
in the test, two containers were marked, one accidentally
and the other on purpose. When apes were then allowed to
choose between the containers, they more often chose the
one marked intentionally than accidentally and they did
this from the earliest trials (see also a study by Povinelli
et al. 1998, in which chimpanzees chose who to receive
juice from based on the actor’s past intentional or acci-
dental actions).
Second, using a helping paradigm, Warneken and
Tomasello (2006) had a human experimenter drop an
object accidentally in the presence of each of three juvenile
chimpanzees, and then strain and reach toward it (with
several different objects in several different situations).
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The chimpanzees fetched it for him. Importantly, they did
not fetch it for him in various control conditions in which
he threw the object away or otherwise indicated a lack of
interest. The chimpanzees’ different behavior in the
experimental and control conditions could be interpreted as
indicating an understanding of the experimenter’s different
goals in the two situations (see also Woodruff and
Premack’s 1979, study with a single chimpanzee). Warneken
et al. (2007) set up another situation in which one chim-
panzee might help another. In this study, one chimpanzee
was attempting to get into an adjoining room, often shaking
the door in his attempt. Other chimpanzees then quite
often, from their advantageous location, pulled a chain that
unlocked the door, so that the first chimpanzee could have
access to the room he wanted to get into. They unlocked
that door more than in a control condition in which the first
chimpanzee was trying to get out of another door. These
studies of instrumental helping suggest that chimpanzees
can tell when someone needs help achieving his goal.
Third, Tomasello and Carpenter (2005) used two imi-
tation tests (from research with human infants) with the
same three juvenile chimpanzees tested in the Warneken
and Tomasello (2006) study. In one test, based on a study
by Meltzoff (1995), a human tried but failed to perform
various actions on objects. The chimpanzees showed that
they successfully discerned the actions the human was
attempting to perform by performing those actions them-
selves (as often as when they had seen her perform them
successfully and more often than when she had just
manipulated the object). In the other test, based on a study
by Carpenter et al. (1998), a human performed two actions
on a series of apparatuses, one intentional and one acci-
dental, before it was the chimpanzees’ turn. Chimpanzees
copied the intentional action more often than the accidental
action. In addition, in a different imitation study based on
that of Gergely et al. (2002), Buttelmann et al. (2007)
demonstrated an unusual action for enculturated chimpan-
zees in two different situations: one in which some con-
straint forced the human to perform that action if he wanted
to attain the goal and the other in which no such constraint
was present. The chimpanzees differentiated these two
situations, imitating more often when the human’s action
was freely chosen intentionally.
Finally, in a natural interaction paradigm, Call et al.
(2004) had a human experimenter give chimpanzees food
repeatedly through a glass panel. Then, on some trials, the
experimenter did not give the food. The experimental
manipulation was that sometimes he did not give it
because he was unwilling to in various ways, whereas
other times he did not give it because he was unable to in
various ways. For example, in the unwilling condition, the
experimenter teased the chimpanzee with the food (pull-
ing it back when the chimpanzee reached for it) and in the
unable condition, he dropped the food clumsily while
trying to give it to the chimpanzee. The basic finding was
that chimpanzees reacted similarly to the different
unwilling actions by expressing frustration and impatience
and they reacted similarly to the different unable actions
by being patient (because he was ‘‘trying’’). This simi-
larity of reaction across the different instantiations of the
two experimental conditions suggests that the chimpan-
zees understood the different goals of the experimenter in
the different conditions, regardless of how they were
expressed behaviorally.
Together, these studies provide very suggestive evi-
dence that chimpanzees (and perhaps other great apes)
understand the goals of others. However, in all of the
studies at test, the human actor behaved slightly differently
in the experimental and control conditions; indeed, the
slightly different behavior in the test phase was the cue to
the different underlying goals involved. This means that
these results could be explained in terms of behavioral
differences of the experimenter at test. In our view, these
explanations are unlikely because of the novelty and
diversity of behaviors used as both cues and responses in
the different studies. Nevertheless, there is still in all cases
a behavioral difference between conditions in the test phase
that could serve as a discriminative cue.
In the current experiments, we investigated whether
great apes could pass a goal understanding test when they
were not able to rely on concurrent behavioral cues. By
doing this, we went one step further than all the studies
cited above: we made the immediate use of such a
behavioral cue impossible by making the experimenter’s
actions during the test phase of the study identical in the
experimental and control conditions. What differed was
only the context leading up to those actions which, for
organisms capable of understanding goals, would lead to a
different interpretation of what the actor was doing in the
two cases (but not for individuals that can base their
response only on concurrent behavioral cues alone).
Study 1a
In this study, we assessed the reactions of all four species
of great apes to an ambiguous action to see whether, based
on the previous context alone, they perceived it as an
attempt to open a box containing food. Note that this is the
first direct test of goal understanding in two of these spe-
cies, gorillas and bonobos.
During the test phase, the experimenter—identically in
both the experimental and control conditions—turned a
piece of metal on top of a box which the ape knew con-
tained food, an action that in some contexts could be seen
as trying to open the box. The difference between
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conditions was that in the experimental condition apes had
previously observed the experimenter manipulating dif-
ferent locks and latches on the top of other boxes and so
opening them (and giving apes the food from inside). Thus,
apes in this condition could assume that she would be
trying to open the final test box as well (see Carpenter et al.
2002, for a similar procedure with 2-year-old children). In
contrast, in the control condition, apes had previously
observed the experimenter simply manipulating the locks
and latches on the top of the other boxes (but not opening
them), and then giving apes food from her pocket. Thus,
apes in this condition should have no assumption that she
would be trying to open the final test box.
If our subjects paid attention only to concurrent
behavioral cues, they should behave identically in the two
conditions since the experimenter’s action on the latch of
the target box was identical in both conditions. If, in con-
trast, great apes were able to include the context leading up
to this action into their assessment of the experimenter’s
goal, this would lead to a different interpretation in the two
conditions: in the experimental condition, they should wait
more patiently because they perceive the experimenter to
be attempting to open the box, whereas in the control
condition, they should be more likely to leave because they
perceive that the experimenter does not want to extract the
grape from the box.
Methods
Participants
Thirty great apes participated in this study. There were 15
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 5 bonobos (Pan paniscus),
5 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and 5 orangutans (Pongo
abelii). There were 19 females and 11 males who ranged in
age from 4 to 32 years (mean age = 14.7 years), see
Table 1. The apes were housed socially in groups of at
least five individuals (separated by species) at the Wolf-
gang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo,
Germany. Each species had access to an indoor area
(230–430 m2) and an outdoor area (1,680–4,000 m2) fur-
nished with various climbing structures, shelter, and natu-
ral vegetation. At night, the apes sleep in several series of
cages (40–50 m2). In addition to experiments, the animals
are provided with an enrichment program, including dif-
ferent kinds of tools and foraging containers. Several times
per day, the apes are fed a diet consisting primarily of
vegetables, fruits, and cereals with regular additions of
eggs and meat for the chimpanzees. Test sessions took
place in a familiar enclosure (approximately 15 m2). The
subjects were used to being separated in adjacent enclo-
sures from their group members for testing. They were not
food deprived for testing, and water was available
throughout all testing times. They were not distressed and
were free to stop participating at any time.
Materials and design
Testing materials consisted of a plastic table (80 9 40 cm),
onto which three differently shaped gray plastic boxes were
permanently fixed; these were the ‘‘context boxes.’’ A
fourth box, the ‘‘test box,’’ could be attached to an empty
space on the right side of the table from the experimenter’s
Table 1 Overview of sex (F female and M male) and age (in years)
of subjects that participated in each study






Chimpanzees Pia F 5 x x x
Alexandra F 6 x x
Anett F 6 x x
Swela F 10 (x)a
Fifi F 12 x x x
Gertruida F 12 x x x
Jahaga F 12 x x x
Sandra F 12 x x x
Natascha F 25 x x
Dorien F 25 x x
Riet F 27 x x x
Ulla F 28 x
Corrie F 28 x x
Fraukje F 29 x x x
Alex M 4 x x
Lome M 4 x x (x)a
Patrick M 8 x x x
Unyoro M 8 x x
Frodo M 11 x x x
Robert M 29 x x x
Bonobos Yasa F 8 x x
Ulindi F 11 x x
Kuno M 8 x x
Limbuko M 9 x x
Joey M 22 x x
Gorillas Viringika F 10 x
Effi F 13 x
Bebe F 26 x
N’Diki F 28 x
Gorgo M 25 x
Orangutans Padana F 7 x
Dokana F 16 x
Pini F 18 x
Dunja F 32 x
Bimbo M 24 x
a These subjects had to be dropped because of inattentiveness
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perspective. The four boxes were of a similar size (1–1.5 l
volume). During sessions, the plastic table was attached to
the outside of a transparent plexiglass window (75 9 50 cm)
in apes’ enclosure. At the bottom of this window were three
holes (5 cm in diameter), the middle one of which served
to provide the food reward to the apes. An opaque rect-
angular piece of plastic (the ‘‘occluder,’’ 50 9 100 cm)
was used to conceal the boxes when necessary (see below).
All boxes were closed by a lid on top, with each lid fea-
turing a distinctive closing mechanism (see Fig. 1). On the
lid of the test box, there was a metal wheel which could be
turned, making an audible, creaking sound. Two cam-
corders recorded the sessions. See Fig. 2 for a sketch of the
general setup.
Each ape participated in both the experimental and the
control condition, within subjects, participating in each
condition in a different session. The two sessions took
place 4 to 6 weeks apart (with one exception where the
delay was 8 weeks). A session consisted of three consec-
utive testing days: In the first 2 days and part of the third
day (‘‘context phase’’), the relevant context (opening vs.
simply manipulating the boxes) was established. During
that phase, only the three context boxes were attached to
the table. On each of the first 2 days, an experimenter (E1)
acted on all three context boxes in three consecutive
rounds. On the third day, after E1 had again acted on the
context boxes for two rounds, a fourth box, the test box,
which was unfamiliar to the apes, was added to the table.
E1 then acted on the context boxes for one more round and
then the test box (‘‘testing phase’’). All together, each ape
thus witnessed nine actions on each of the context boxes
(three times per day 9 3 days) and one action on the test
box in each condition. Each condition was administered by
a different experimenter to reduce carryover effects. On
each day, testing lasted about 15 min per subject. Order of
conditions was counterbalanced, with gender and age
matched as closely as possible.
Procedure
During the context phase of the experiment, apes were
provided information about the context in which an
experimenter (E1) was operating. The information pro-
vided varied according to condition both in terms of (1) the
causal relatedness of E1’s action on the context boxes and
(2) the retrieval of the grapes. In the experimental condi-
tion, it was necessary to manipulate the boxes to retrieve
the grapes because they were inside the boxes, whereas in
the control condition, it was not necessary because the
grapes came out of E1’s chest pocket.
After baiting the pocket or the context boxes out of the
ape’s view and setting up the test equipment, E1 sat down
on a stool in front of the testing table, called the ape’s
attention and began to manipulate the context boxes one by
one, from left to right, differently according to the exper-
imental condition:
Experimental condition E1 slowly opened the latch of the
first context box for 5–7 s, then lowered her hands to her
lap (for approximately 2 s), then opened the lid of that box,
retrieved a grape from out of the box, closed the lid, and
handed the grape to the ape through the middle hole in the
window. She then moved to the next box in the sequence
and opened it following this procedure.
Fig. 1 Sketch of the closing devices of the four boxes used in Study 1
Fig. 2 Sketch of the experimental setup used in Study 1
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Control condition E1 acted on the latch of the first con-
text box in the same way, for the same amount of time as in
the experimental condition, lowered her hands for 2 s, and
then without opening the box retrieved a grape from the
chest pocket in her overalls and handed it to the ape
through the middle hole in the window. She then repeated
this behavior with the next box in the sequence.
On the first 2 days, she performed this procedure three
times, and on the third day twice. For repetitions, after
having manipulated all three boxes, E1 blocked the ape’s
view of the boxes with the occluder and restored the boxes
to their original state with latches closed. In the control
condition, in which E1 did not open boxes, she neverthe-
less occluded them and made some audible noise with the
latches so as to match the other condition.
The testing phase, which consisted of a single trial, took
place at the end of the third day. After E1 had acted on the
context boxes as described above for two rounds, she put
up the occluder and left the testing room. A second
experimenter (E2) entered the testing room and attached
the unfamiliar test box with the lid open to the right end of
the table. E2 removed the occluder, called the ape to ensure
that it attended, and then showed the ape a grape, placed it
in the test box, closed the lid, and pressed on the lid to
demonstrate that it was closed tight. E2 then handed the
ape a grape and left to a distant corner of the testing room.
E1 returned and started to manipulate the boxes from left to
right. After she had given the ape the third grape, she called
the ape’s attention again and started to act on the test box
by spinning the wheel on top of its lid. At first, E1 acted on
the test box in much the same way as she had acted on the
context boxes but then she did not stop spinning the wheel
for a total of 120 s. She looked only at the box during this
time (as she had done in the context phase). During these
2 min, the ape’s behavior was coded (see below). After the
2 min had passed, the test was over. E2 signaled to E1, who
stood up and left the room. E2 fed the ape another grape
and retrieved the closed test box to store it away for the
next ape.
To eliminate superficial cues, special care was taken in
both conditions to display only a completely neutral facial
expression and to look only at the boxes. Note that the two
conditions thus varied only in E1’s action during the con-
text phase prior to the testing phase. E1’s action on the test
box during the testing phase was identical in both
conditions.
Coding and analyses
Two main types of response measures were scored from
videotape (frame by frame) by the second author during the
test phase, the 120 s that E1 acted on the test box:
‘‘participation’’ and ‘‘behavioral rate’’ (as was done in Call
et al. 2004). Participation was the amount of time apes
remained at the testing site. The corners of a large square
(1 m2) were marked with paint on the floor in front of the
plexiglass window inside the enclosure (see Fig. 2). An ape
leaving this critical area was coded as leaving the testing
site. Two different participation measures were scored:
‘‘latency’’ and ‘‘attendance.’’ Latency was the time in
seconds from the moment E1 began manipulating the test
box until the moment the apes first left (i.e., moved their
whole body out of) the square. Attendance was the overall
time in seconds accumulated in the square during the
2-minute response period. For example, an ape who left the
testing site after 15 s, came back 20 s later, and stayed for
another 35 s before leaving for the rest of the trial would
accumulate an overall attendance of 50 s.
Behavioral rate was the frequency with which apes
showed communicative behaviors to E1 while they were in
the critical square during the test. For example, if a subject
stayed at the testing site overall for 100 s and produced a
behavior five times, the corresponding behavioral rate
would be 5/100 = 0.05. Following Call et al. (2004), we
specifically looked for behaviors that express impatience
and/or requests for food. These behaviors were (1) bang-
ing: making an audible noise by hitting the plexiglass
window or any part of the enclosure with any body part
(two or more events with less then a second in between
them were scored as one event—one bout) and (2) poking:
sticking one or more fingers through one of the three holes
at the bottom of the plexiglass window (each time one or
more fingertips protruded through the plexiglass window it
was scored as one event). No other behaviors were coded.
For inter-observer reliability, a second coder who was
naı¨ve to the hypotheses of the study and blind to condition
scored a randomly chosen 20 % of the trials from all apes.
Agreement was excellent: Spearman correlations (all p’s
two-tailed) for attendance: rs = 1.00, N = 12, p \ 0.001,
for latency: rs = 0.998, N = 12, p \ 0.001, and for
behavioral rate: rs = 0.975, N = 12, p \ 0.001. The cod-
ers’ judgments did not differ on any of the measures:
Wilcoxon tests, all p’s C 0.161.
Our data severely violated the assumption of normality.
Therefore, we used nonparametric statistics. For analyses
across all apes (group level analyses), we conducted Wil-
coxon exact tests. Further, Kruskal–Wallis H tests were
used to analyze for differences between species. In par-
ticular, to assess the effect of species on the dependent
variables, we calculated the difference between the
experimental and the control condition for each individual
and then compared the species as described. We conducted
Wilcoxon exact tests for analyses on each species sepa-
rately (species level analyses). Given our clear predictions
regarding the direction of the expected effects, we report
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one-tailed p values throughout Study 1 when comparing
performance in the two conditions. We used Fisher’s




Latency There were significant differences in latency
between conditions at the group level: apes left the testing
site significantly faster in the control than in the experi-
mental condition, T? = 194.50, N = 21 (9 ties),
p = 0.002, r = 0.501. Although this effect was mainly
caused by the chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ performances
(see Fig. 3, Table 2), there were no significant differences
in latency across species, H = 1.99, N = 30, p = 0.574.
Attendance Apes also spent significantly more time at the
testing site in the experimental than the control condition,
T? = 183.00, N = 20 (10 ties), p = 0.001, r = 0.532.
Again, although this effect was mainly caused by the
chimpanzees and bonobos (see Fig. 4, Table 2), there were
no significant differences across species, H = 4.32,
N = 30, p = 0.229.
Behavioral rate
There were no significant differences between conditions,
with apes showing the behaviors we measured in an
average of 7–8 % of the time in both conditions, T? =
196.50, N = 26 (4 ties), p = 0.432, r = 0.033. There were
also no significant differences in behavioral rate across
species, H = 0.726, N = 30, p = 0.867 (see Table 2).
There were no significant effects of gender (all
p’s C 0.174) or testing order (all p’s C 0.566) for any of
the measures, Mann–Whitney U tests.
Discussion
In this study, the apes’ performance as a group on two of
the three measures supports the hypothesis that they took
Fig. 3 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for latency to leave for all
species combined and for each species separately in Study 1a
Table 2 Means (and SEM) for all three measures in Study 1a
Measure













All species 89.97 (7.24) 64.67 (8.32) 107.07 (3.28) 95.03 (4.98) 0.082 (0.014) 0.089 (0.015)
Chimpanzees 74.33 (11.01) 48.60 (10.12) 102.47 (4.83) 85.33 (6.82) 0.129 (0.022) 0.140 (0.021)
Bonobos 100.20 (18.82) 49.80 (20.38) 109.00 (10.27) 105.00 (5.72) 0.032 (0.014) 0.047 (0.024)
Gorillas 96.60 (14.39) 80.60 (24.14) 106.00 (7.60) 97.40 (18.02) 0.037 (0.018) 0.034 (0.017)
Orangutans 120.00 (0.00) 111.80 (8.20) 120.00 (0.00) 111.80 (8.20) 0.037 (0.002) 0.031 (0.009)
Fig. 4 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for the number of seconds
spent in front of the window for all species combined and for each
species separately in Study 1a
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the experimenter’s goal into account during the test: they
waited longer before leaving the critical area and stayed in
this area for a longer duration in the experimental condition
in which it was natural to see the first experimenter’s
manipulation of the top of the box as an attempt to open it.
They did this even though during the entire test phase the
experimenter’s behavior was identical in the experimental
and control conditions. Although we found no significant
differences between species, an inspection of the data
indicated that the results were driven by the responses of
the chimpanzees and bonobos. In contrast, the gorillas and
orangutans had similar latency and attendance results in
both conditions. This is perhaps especially surprising for
orangutans, given that they do succeed on some tests of
goal and intention understanding (see Buttelmann et al.
2008; Call and Tomasello 1998). One possibility is simply
that gorillas and orangutans generally move less or more
slowly than chimpanzees and bonobos, and that our
response period was too short to reveal any differences
between conditions.
It is important to be clear about the logic of this
experiment in terms of what caused the difference in apes’
behavior in the two conditions. One possible interpretation
is the following. During the context phase, apes in both
conditions repeatedly experienced moving from box to
box, giving them food in association with each box with
precisely the same timing (every 5–7 s). Then, for the test
box, apes in both conditions were expecting food at the end
of that 5- to 7-second interval: apes in the experimental
condition from the box and apes in the control condition
from the first experimenter’s pocket. But in neither con-
dition did the experimenter hand over any food at this
point; instead he kept on turning the wheel on top of this
box. So how long should the ape wait after that in the hopes
of still receiving food? If apes were operating on pure
temporal associations, they should have waited equally in
the two conditions: in both conditions, in the context phase
they had experienced repeatedly the experimenter manip-
ulating the gadget on top of the box and then giving them
food (either from the box or her pocket). The temporal
associative strength between manipulating the top of the
box and receiving food should thus have been identical in
the two cases. However, we found that the apes in the
experimental condition stayed longer. It is thus likely that
apes waited longer in the experimental condition because
they saw the experimenter’s current actions as trying to
open the box, that is, as having the (so far unsuccessful)
goal of opening the box.
The key to this explanation is that apes in the control
condition were expecting the food from the pocket in the
same way that apes in the experimental condition were
expecting the food from the box. When they did not get
it—the script had changed—the question is why they
decided to stay or leave. We think that the apes in the
control condition had little on which to base this decision:
the human did not behave as expected, and it is unclear
what she was doing still twirling the metal on top of the
box. They thus had very little reason to expect a piece of
food other than blind hope, and indeed, it is possible that
the experimenter had simply changed her mind about
giving them food at all (thus being unwilling). In contrast,
apes in the experimental condition had seen the human in
the past using the metal on the top of boxes to open them,
and so they saw the current behavior as another version of
this—albeit so far unsuccessful—with the first experi-
menter’s desire to give them food still intact (but being
unable to open this box). For them, then, it might thus pay
to wait for the experimenter’s success. This result fits well
with the study by Call et al. (2004) who found that chim-
panzees waited longer for an experimenter who was willing
but unable to give them food compared to one who was
able but unwilling.
A possible alternative explanation is that the apes in the
control condition might simply have given up on the food
from the pocket and they had no specific reason to expect
the food from the box, but the apes in the experimental
condition had experienced boxes opening in the past and so
they expected this one to open too—without any consid-
eration of the human’s goals. This alternative, however,
cannot explain why apes in the control condition gave up
on the grape they were expecting (from the pocket),
whereas in the experimental condition did not give up.
Nevertheless, the methodological point is that the con-
trol condition of this study could have been instantiated in
various ways. Thus, another possibility would be to have
the first experimenter open each of the context boxes in the
control condition, as in the experimental condition, but
then still give food from her pocket. We chose not to do
this initially because we were afraid that if apes were not
paying close attention, they would see the experimenter
open the boxes and then give them food and assume it
came from the boxes. That is, we chose the way we did
because we wanted the difference between conditions to be
clear to the apes. However, since they did differentiate
between conditions in this first study, we decided to try this
second, more demanding version of the control condition.
Study 1b
In this study, we replicated the general procedure of the
previous study, but now in the control condition, the first
experimenter opened each box before she gave the ape
food from her pocket. We predicted the same general
pattern of findings as in Study 1a. We tested chimpanzees
and bonobos, the two species that showed the largest
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differences between conditions in latency in Study 1a (see
Fig. 3). The mean delay between Study 1a and Study 1b
was for chimpanzees 54 weeks and for bonobos 23 weeks.
Methods
Participants
The same five bonobos (mean age = 11.6 years, age ran-
ge = 8–22 years; 3 males and 2 females) and 14 of the 15
chimpanzees that had participated in Study 1a participated
in this experiment (one male chimpanzee that had been
tested in Study 1a refused to participate and therefore was
not tested). In addition, four other adult female chimpan-
zees that had not participated in Study 1a participated in
this experiment, for a total of 18 chimpanzees (mean
age = 14.8 years, range = 4–29 years; 5 males and 13
females), see Table 1 for details.
Materials and design
The materials used in Study 1a were modified slightly for
this experiment to reduce carryover effects. Specifically,
the positions of the boxes were rearranged on the table and
they were painted a different color (yellow). Apart from
that, the materials, general setup, and the design of Study
1b matched that of Study 1a. Again, each ape participated
in both conditions.
Procedure
The same general procedure was used as in Study 1a. What
differed were the details of the conditions presented to apes
in the context phase. In this study, after the first experi-
menter (E1) opened each context box, she stood up before
giving a grape to the apes in both conditions. We had E1
stand up because of the spatial closeness of E1’s chest
pocket and the boxes—to help apes see clearly where the
grapes were taken from—either out of E1’s chest pocket or
out of the context box.
Experimental condition E1 kneeled in front of the table
supporting the boxes. She opened the latch of the first box,
lifted the lid, stood up, retrieved a grape from out of the box,
closed the lid, and handed the grape to the ape through the
middle hole of the window. She then got down on her knees
again and started the same procedure with the next box.
Control condition E1 opened the latch of the first box in
the same way as in the other condition, opened the lid,
stood up, closed the lid, retrieved a grape from out of her
chest pocket, and handed it to the ape through the middle
hole of the window. She then got down on her knees again
and started the same procedure with the next box.
As before, E1’s behavior during the test phase was
identical in both conditions: she twisted a wheel on top of
the test box (see Study 1a).
Coding and analyses
The apes’ behavior was scored by the second author and
analyzed in the same way as in Study 1a, with the excep-
tion that Mann–Whitney U tests were used to analyze for
differences between species in this study. Again, a second,
naı¨ve coder scored a randomly chosen 20 % of the trials
from all apes blind to condition, and interobserver reli-
ability was excellent: Spearman correlations (all p’s two-
tailed) for attendance: rs = 1.00, N = 12, p \ 0.001, for
latency: rs = 0.997, N = 12, p \ 0.001, and for behavioral
rate: rs = 0.985, N = 12, p \ 0.001. The coders’ judg-
ments did not differ on any of the measures: Wilcoxon
tests, all p’s C 0.104.
Results
Participation
Latency Overall, there were no significant differences in
latency between conditions, T? = 117.00, N = 19 (4 ties),
p = 0.195, r = 0.185 and no significant differences
between species, U = 34.0, N = 23, p = 0.434 (see
Fig. 5, Table 3).
Attendance Overall, there were also no significant dif-
ferences between conditions on the time apes spent at the
testing site, T? = 127.00, N = 19 (4 ties), p = 0.103,
r = 0.269 and no significant differences between species,
U = 25.50, N = 23, p = 0.154 (Fig. 6, Table 3).
Fig. 5 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for latency to leave for both
species combined and for each species separately in Study 1b
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Behavioral rate There were also no significant differ-
ences in behavioral rate between conditions, with apes
showing the behaviors we measured in an average of
3–4 % of the time in both conditions, T? = 145.50,
N = 20 (3 ties), p = 0.275, r = 0.129. There were no
differences between species, U = 32.00, N = 23,
p = 0.363 (Table 3).
There were no significant effects of gender (all
p’s C 0.265) or order (all p’s C 0.093) for any of the
measures, Mann–Whitney U tests.
Comparison of studies
Because most of the apes in this study had already partici-
pated in Study 1a, to see whether there were any carryover
effects (e.g., habituation to the testing situation over the two
studies), we compared the latency and attendance measures
across the two studies. Wilcoxon exact tests on attendance
showed that apes spent significantly less time at the testing
site in Study 1b than in Study 1a in the experimental condi-
tion, suggesting some habituation, T = 82.00, N = 13 (6
ties), p = 0.008, r = 0.585. This was not the case in the
Control condition, T = 94.50, N = 17 (2 ties), p = 0.411,
r = 0.195. No difference between studies was found for
latency in either condition, both p’s C 0.194.
Discussion
The results of Study 1a were not replicated in this study.
This is probably due to three factors. First, the experi-
mental and control conditions in this study were extremely
similar, and any lapses of attention on the apes’ part could
easily lead to the two conditions appearing identical. Sec-
ond, because this study was run after the first study, apes
may have habituated to the situation. Indeed, overall, apes
waited in the critical area less in the experimental condition
in this study than they did in the first study. Third, apes in
the control condition of this study had at least some reason
to expect two pieces of food (the grape from the test box
and one from the experimenter’s pocket), whereas apes in
the experimental condition had reason to expect only one
(the one from the test box). One or more of these reasons
might have prevented the apes from showing an under-
standing of others’ goals in the absence of immediate
behavioral cues in this experiment.
A possible alternative explanation of both studies is that
the apes were not attending to the first experimenter’s
goals, but only to the causal relations involved in the sit-
uation. Thus, in the control condition, there was no causal
relationship between the experimenter opening the box and
apes’ receipt of food from his pocket, whereas in the
experimental condition, there was a causal relation. How-
ever, this causal relation is not physical causality. In the
experimental condition, the opening of the box is causally
related to the ape getting food only in the sense that it
enables the experimenter to go on to perform the goal-
directed action of grasping the food and giving it to the ape.
To say that in the experimental condition, opening the box
was causally related to the experimenter’s giving the food
(in a way that it was not in the control condition) is simply
to say that there were physical conditions that enabled the
experimenter’s goal-directed action. Given this analysis,
we might then predict that at test, when the experimenter is
manipulating the mechanism on top of the box and it does
not work in the normal amount of time, if the apes were
Table 3 Means (and SEM) for all three measures in Study 1b
Measure













All species 74.61 (8.80) 67.39 (9.63) 89.39 (7.01) 84.61 (7.57) 0.055 (0.011) 0.048 (0.010)
Chimpanzees 76.44 (9.58) 65.17 (10.88) 87.83 (8.13) 79.11 (9.14) 0.056 (0.012) 0.053 (0.011)
Bonobos 68.00 (23.25) 75.40 (22.69) 95.00 (14.89) 104.40 (6.85) 0.053 (0.031) 0.026 (0.019)
Fig. 6 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for the number of seconds
spent in front of the window for both species combined and for each
species separately in Study 1b
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only focused on the causality of the box, they should
conclude that the normal causal sequence was a failure—
and so they should leave. The fact that they stayed suggests
that they understood that so long as the experimenter had
the goal of giving them food, and opening the box was
simply an enabling condition for that, then they should stay
to see if her further attempts (driven by her goal of giving
them food) would succeed.
It is also relevant that in the control condition, the
experimenter finishing manipulating the box was, at least in
a weak sense, an enabling condition for the experimenter
reaching into her pocket to get the food—as she could not
do two things at once with her hands—and so the two
conditions were not so different in terms of causality after
all. Given this analysis, if the apes were only focused on
how free hands enable food acquisition then in the control
condition, at test they should wait until the experimenter
finished manipulating the box, as that would enable her to
get and give the food; but, at least in the first experiment,
they did not do this. In any case, we think that any causal
relations that might have played a role in the current study
did so within the context of the experimenter’s goal-
directed actions. However, recognizing that it is difficult to
determine whether the apes were using causal or inten-
tional understanding in this study, and in Study 2, we
adopted a different paradigm in which there was basically
no physical causality involved.
Study 2
To further investigate the question of whether great apes
can understand the goals of others in the absence of con-
current behavioral cues based only on context, we ran
another study with chimpanzees using a second, very dif-
ferent methodology. The basic idea was that animals quite
often anticipate what an individual will do based only on an
‘‘intention movement’’ at the start of the behavior (Tin-
bergen 1953). We manipulated the context to see whether
chimpanzees would interpret what a human was doing
differently—even though her behavior during the test was
identical in all conditions—as a function of what potential
goals were available. In fact, we manipulated the situation
so that chimpanzees would normally be expecting one
thing to happen, based on past experience, but then some
novel event intervened that could potentially lead to a
different prediction, if the chimpanzees understood that this
might lead to a change in the actor’s goal.
Thus, a human sat on a stool giving chimpanzees food
from a bucket through a mesh panel. There was also a
second bucket containing food in front of another mesh
panel some meters away. On several occasions in a pretest,
the human stood up from her stool, went over to this other
bucket, and gave the chimpanzee food from it. In this sit-
uation, the chimpanzees quickly learned to anticipate as
soon as the human stood up what she was going to do, so
they headed for the second bucket straightaway. In the test
phase of the experiment—identically in all conditions—the
experimenter again stood up from her stool and turned her
body in the direction of the second bucket. However, in the
experimental condition (which was instantiated in three
different ways), something happened immediately prior to
the experimenter standing up, for example, a call came
from a walkie-talkie in the same direction as the second
bucket, or another human threw a clipboard to the exper-
imenter and it landed short (again, in the same direction as
the second bucket). The question was whether the chim-
panzees would predict that the human was again heading
for the other food bucket, as she had done previously in the
same situation, or whether they would instead correctly
assume that that goal had been preempted by a new goal to
get the walkie-talkie or the clipboard as more immediate
and salient needs.
As a comparison to the experimental condition, we
included two other conditions. In the control condition,
again a similar event occurred immediately prior to the
experimenter standing up, but the difference was that the
experimenter herself caused this event, and so it should not
be expected to preempt her goal of feeding the chimpanzee
from the other bucket. This condition was included in order
to check whether chimpanzees’ response behavior could be
influenced only by the pure presence or distraction of an
event occurring. In the other condition, the baseline con-
dition, no such event happened at all.
If our conclusions from Study 1 were correct, chim-
panzees would interpret exactly the same behavior of the
experimenter differently depending on their understanding
of the goal the experimenter was pursuing by standing
up—even though their past experience in this situation
should lead them to expect that the experimenter would be
headed for the other food bucket. Specifically, they should
leave for the other bucket more quickly in the control and
baseline conditions than in the experimental condition (in
which the experimenter seemingly had another goal in
standing up). In contrast, if chimpanzees paid attention
only to concurrent behavioral cues, they should not show
any difference in reaction between conditions: the experi-
menter’s action during the test phase was identical, thus
subjects should leave equally quickly in all conditions.
Methods
Participants
Thirteen of the chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) that had
participated in Study 1b and two additional chimpanzees
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participated in this study. However, the youngest male and
one of the two additional chimpanzees, a female, had to be
dropped after they had received the first trials because of
inattentiveness. The final group of 14 chimpanzees ranged
in age from 7 to 31 years, with a mean age of 19.2 years
(females: mean age = 20.4 years, range = 7–30 years;
males: mean age = 15.8 years, range = 9–31 years).
Materials and design
Test sessions took place in two of the chimpanzees’
familiar enclosures (approximately 15 m2 each). The cages
were connected by a hydraulic door that could be adjusted
at different heights. Since all subjects were quite familiar
with crossing through this door, they knew that if the door
was opened completely, it was easy for them to cross
through very quickly. However, if one closed the door
partially, the apes’ speed in crossing could be reduced until
a point where they would still fit through the door but
would refuse to cross.
See Fig. 7 for a sketch of the setup. Two plastic buckets
(25 cm in diameter), unfamiliar to the chimpanzees, with
lids made of pieces of cardboard (22 9 31 cm) attached
on top, were placed in front of plexiglass windows at
opposite sides (location A and B) of the zookeepers’
hallway in front of the chimpanzees’ enclosures. The
buckets were filled with grapes. A plastic stool (25 cm
high) was placed behind (from chimpanzees’ perspective)
each of those buckets. Two plastic barriers (100 9 50 cm
each) were put between location A and location B right
next to location A. The barriers served to increase the time
E1 needed to walk from one location to the other and thus
give chimpanzees more time to make a prediction about
where E1 might go in each trial. One clipboard was placed
behind the stool at location A and a second clipboard was
placed outside the test room (to be used in the test ses-
sion). A pair of walkie-talkies (13 9 5 cm each) was used
in one of the conditions. Both clipboards and walkie-
talkies were familiar to the chimpanzees. We marked the
edges of an area of approximately 1 square meter with
yellow paint on the floor of the chimpanzees’ side of the
window at location A—the ‘‘critical area’’ to be used for
coding. Each session was videotaped from four different
angles (see Fig. 7).
A within-subjects design was used. There were two
sessions: a warm-up session and a test session. In the test
session, each chimpanzee participated in all conditions (see
below). For each condition, there were different numbers
of trials with one to four trials each, for a total of 11 trials.
These trials were presented in counterbalanced order in
such a way that not more than two trials in a row were of
the same condition. The test session lasted about 20 min
per subject.
Procedure
Warm-up session All chimpanzees were given a warm-up
session in which they were fed by Experimenter 1 (E1) at
the two locations (A and B). Because of constraints on
available testing time, this session took place 3 months
before chimpanzees participated in the test session. In this
warm-up session, only the stools and the covered buckets
containing food were present (there were no barriers,
walkie-talkies, or clipboards). First, E1 fed the chimpanzee
from bucket A, then got up and walked over to location B,
sat down, and fed the chimpanzee from bucket B. After
feeding the chimpanzee, there she got up again and walked
back to location A to start a new trial. The number of
grapes given each time at each location varied between one
and three (randomized), so that chimpanzees could not
predict when feeding at one location was over within each
trial. Each time E1 walked from location A to location B,
Experimenter 2 (E2) observed the chimpanzee’s moving
behavior and adjusted the height of the door opening
between the two cages accordingly. That is, if the door was
fully open, chimpanzees were likely to pass through
immediately, whereas if the opening was smaller, they
hesitated more to cross through (and at some point refused
to cross). During these trials, E2 thus adjusted the height of
the door up or down until each chimpanzee met the fol-
lowing criterion: they should not have entered Enclosure 2
before E1 had crossed the criterion line but should have
entered this enclosure completely by the time E1 reached
location B. Thus, for each chimpanzee, a different door
height was determined at which he or she entered Enclo-
sure 2, meeting the criterion. As soon as the chimpanzee
met this criterion twice in a row, after feeding the
Fig. 7 The setup used in Study 2: E1 feeding S from one of two
locations (A and B) with locations of the materials used in the control
and the three experimental conditions indicated
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chimpanzee from bucket A once, E1 stood up, walked in
the direction of location B, but this time turned left and
pretended to arrange the cameras in the booth. She then
went back to location A and continued feeding. Thus, this
‘‘camera check’’ was an interruption of the feeding process
at location A and was performed in order to inform
chimpanzees that E1 did not go immediately to location B
every time she got up at location A.
Test session For the test session, when chimpanzees
entered the test room, the two covered buckets filled with
grapes were already in place in front of the windows at
locations A and B, with the stools behind them and the
barriers near location A. There was a clipboard behind
stool A. The door was adjusted to the specific criterion for
that chimpanzee and then E1 and E2 started to talk using
the walkie-talkies for about five minutes to ensure that
chimpanzees noticed that these were functionally equiva-
lent to the ones usually used by their keepers and other
researchers. During that time, they set up the four cameras
used to videotape the test session. After setting up the
cameras, E1 placed her walkie-talkie at the location shown
in Fig. 7 and sat down on stool A to start feeding the
chimpanzee from that bucket.
To ensure that the chimpanzees remembered the basic
feeding procedure from the warm-up session and to intro-
duce the barriers, chimpanzees were given further warm-up
trials. In these warm-up trials, E1 fed the chimpanzee from
bucket A, then got up and stepped over the barriers, looking
only down at the barriers or at the wall behind them while
doing so. She then briefly paused in front of an inconspic-
uously marked line (the ‘‘criterion line’’; see Fig. 7) before
she stepped over it and walked over to location B to feed the
chimpanzee there. After feeding from location B, E1
walked back to location A again and started the next warm-
up trial. As in the warm-up session, the number of grapes
given to a chimpanzee at each location varied between one
and three for each trial. During this warm-up period, E2
again observed the chimpanzee during the time it took E1 to
walk from location A to location B (approximately 17 s) to
ensure that they did not enter Enclosure 2 before E1 had
passed the criterion line but had entered this enclosure
before E1 had sat down on the stool at location B. As soon
as this criterion was reached (but after a minimum of at least
five warm-up trials), E1 repeated the ‘‘camera check’’ as
described for the warm-up session. After this camera check,
the test trials began.
As in the warm-up trials, E1 began by feeding the
chimpanzee at location A. However, during test trials, in
some conditions (experimental and control), some event
made E1 stop feeding, whereas in other conditions (base-
line), no external event could be observed before she
stopped feeding. In all conditions, E1 then turned her head
toward the direction of location B, looking toward the stool
at this location, looked back to the chimpanzee, got up,
turned toward the barriers, stepped over each of them while
looking at them or the wall behind them, and paused for a
second in front of the criterion line. What she did then
varied between the conditions. However, it is important to
note that up until E1 paused in front of the criterion line—
during which time chimpanzees’ behavior was measured—
E1’s behavior in every condition (including baseline and
control conditions) was identical.
Experimental conditions In all of the trials of the exper-
imental condition, there was an observable event that
caused E1 to stop feeding the chimpanzee at location A and
get up. We expected that this event would lead chimpan-
zees to be less likely to predict that E1 was getting up to go
to location B to feed them there. In order to avoid repeating
the same event multiple times, we used three different
events corresponding to the following three conditions:
Walkie-talkie While E1 was feeding the chimpanzee, E2,
who was outside the room, called E1 through the walkie-
talkie placed between location A and location B. E1 looked
ambiguously in the direction of the stool at location B and
the walkie-talkie, looked at the chimpanzee, got up, crossed
the barriers, and paused in front of the criterion line. Then,
she took one more step, bent down, picked up the walkie-
talkie from the floor and said, ‘‘Yes, I can hear you.’’ She
then turned off the walkie-talkie and put it down again.
Ask for clipboard E1 stopped feeding the chimpanzee,
looked ambiguously in the direction of the stool at location
B and the door by looking at a point in between these two
locations, and called E2’s name. E2 opened the door and
answered ‘‘Yes?’’, and E1 asked him to give her a clip-
board, performing a chimpanzee-like request gesture with
her right arm. E2 threw a clipboard into her direction such
that it landed at an inconspicuously marked spot between
location A and B. E1 turned back to the chimpanzee and
got up as before. After she had paused in front of the
criterion line, she made one more step, bent down, and
picked up the clipboard.
E2 calls From the door, E2 called E1 by name and asked
her to come outside the test room with a beckoning gesture.
As soon as E2 called her E1 stopped feeding, looked
ambiguously in the direction of the stool at location B and the
door while talking to E1, then looked back to the chimpan-
zee, got up, and crossed the barriers as before. After the short
pause in front of the criterion line, she walked directly toward
location B but before getting there turned right and left the
test room for about 40 s. She then returned.
After each of these trials, E1 went back to location A
and continued feeding the chimpanzee there. Each
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chimpanzee received each of these trials once (to avoid
learning effects) in counterbalanced order.
Control condition (drop clipboard) In the one trial in this
condition, a similar observable event occurred that caused
E1 to stop feeding chimpanzees at location A, but we
expected it not to alter chimpanzees’ prediction that E1
would go feed them at location B, because it was caused
directly by E1 herself. After E1 sat down on stool A, she
reached behind her, picked up the clipboard, and put it on
her lap. She then fed the chimpanzee, stopped, took the
clipboard with both hands, and dropped it intentionally on
the floor at her left side. Then, she looked ambiguously in
the direction of the stool in location B, back to the chim-
panzee, got up, stepped over the barriers, paused, and
walked over to location B to feed the chimpanzee there.
Baseline conditions (baseline and post-experimental
baseline) In the baseline conditions, no observable event
occurred before E1 stopped feeding, so in general we
expected chimpanzees to predict that E1 was getting up to
go feed them at location B. E1 simply stopped, looked
ambiguously in the direction of the stool at location B,
back to the chimpanzee, got up, stepped over the barriers,
paused, and walked over to location B to feed the chim-
panzee there. There were two types of baseline trials, those
which immediately followed experimental trials (post-
experimental baseline; three trials) and those which did not
(baseline; four trials). The procedure for both was identical;
we distinguished the two types simply because we thought
that in the post-experimental baseline trials, the fact that
chimpanzees had just previously experienced E1 not
approaching location B in the experimental conditions
might result in a lower likelihood of leaving the critical
area quickly in succeeding trials. The post-experimental
baseline trials also served to boost chimpanzees’ perfor-
mance back up to pre-experimental trials levels.
We measured chimpanzees’ leaving behavior from the
time E1 looked at stool B before getting up from stool A until
she paused briefly in front of the criterion line. Thus, E1’s
behavior during the period in which we measured chimpan-
zees’ response behavior was identical in all conditions, and
chimpanzees could make no predictions about where E1
might go solely from her actions during that period.
Coding, reliability, and analysis
The first author coded chimpanzees’ leaving behavior from
the videotapes, blind to condition. We analyzed the data in
two different ways. First, the main analysis was done on the
number of seconds chimpanzees waited before leaving the
critical area in each response phase (i.e., from when E1
looked toward stool B to when E1 paused after having
stepped over both barriers). Second, we matched chimpan-
zees’ response behavior to E1’s action more precisely by
coding E1’s behavior at the moment the chimpanzees left the
critical area using a scale consisting of 29 different steps (see
Table 4). Leaving the critical area was defined as the moment
when all four of the chimpanzees’ limbs had left the marked
square by the window. To assess interobserver reliability, a
naı¨ve coder also watched the videotapes, blind to condition,
and rated 25 % of the trials in both ways. An excellent level of
interobserver agreement was reached: Spearman’s correla-
tions (all p’s two-tailed) for seconds: rs = 0.946, p \ 0.001
and for the scale: rs = 0.933, p \ 0.001. The coders’ judg-
ments did not differ on any of the measures: Wilcoxon tests,
all p’s C 0.097.
For statistical analysis and comparison across condi-
tions, we calculated means for the three experimental, the
Table 4 The scale used for coding chimpanzees’ performance in
relation to E1’s actions
Step E1’s behavior
1 E1 looks at stool B
2 E1 looks at S again
3 E1 gets up
4 E1 turns
5 1st leg lifted (in front of barrier 1)
6 1st foot visible above barrier 1
7 1st leg lowered
8 E1 stands above barrier 1
9 2nd leg lifted
10 2nd foot visible above barrier 1
11 2nd leg lowered
12 E1 stands between the barriers
13 1st leg lifted (in front of barrier 2)
14 1st foot visible above barrier 2
15 1st leg lowered
16 E1 stands above barrier 2
17 2nd leg lifted
18 2nd foot visible above barrier 2
19 2nd leg lowered






26 E1 turns (in order to sit down)
27 E1 takes a seat
28 E1 sits on stool B
29 S does not leave critical area
Explanation: a step lasts from lifting the foot to setting the foot down
again. In between steps add .5 to the step just finished
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four baseline, and the three post-experimental baseline
trials for each chimpanzee. Since during testing, it became
obvious that females seemed to pay more attention than
males, and we also analyzed both genders separately.
Unfortunately, statistical tests could only be calculated for
females (n = 10) because of the males’ small sample size
(n = 4). Friedman tests were run to test for differences in
the chimpanzees’ performance across conditions overall.
Then, based on those results, protected Wilcoxon tests
were used to determine specific differences between con-
ditions (see Cohen and Cohen 1983). Given our clear
predictions regarding the direction of the expected effects
(as based on previous studies and the results of Study 1a),
again, we report one-tailed p values throughout.
Results
Mean latencies for each condition are presented in Table 5.
The chimpanzees behaved differently in the different condi-
tions in terms of latency to leave, Friedman’s v(3)
2 = 10.63,
N = 14, p = 0.011(exact, two-tailed). When single condi-
tions were compared, a large effect was found only between
the experimental and the baseline condition, Wilcoxon
T?= 84.00, N = 14, p = 0.025, r = 0.528, but there was a
moderate (but nonsignificant) effect for the comparison
between the experimental and the control condition,
T?= 76.00, N = 14, p = 0.074, r = 0.394, see Fig. 8. Sim-
ilar results were found when we analyzed the data using the
scale: a large effect between the experimental (mean: 11.81
steps) and the baseline (mean: 9.65 steps) condition, and a
moderate effect for differences between the experimental and
the control (mean: 10.71 steps) condition (with the same
p values as found for the analysis on seconds).
When we analyzed the females’ performance separately,
we found that they showed significant differences between
conditions, Friedman’s v(3)
2 = 10.32, N = 10, p = 0.012
(exact, two-tailed). When single conditions were compared,
we found that as a group females significantly waited longer
in front of the window in the experimental condition than in
the baseline, the post-experimental baseline, and the control
conditions (experimental baseline: T?= 46.00, N = 10,
p = 0.032, r = 0.596; experimental control: T?= 45.00,
N = 10, p = 0.040, r = 0.564, and experimental post-
experimental baseline: T?= 46.00, N = 10, p = 0.030,
r = 0.597), see Fig. 9. No significant differences were found
between the baseline, the post-experimental baseline, and the
control conditions (all r’s B 0.194). Again, similar results
were found when we analyzed the data using the scale: sig-
nificant differences between the experimental (mean: 10.54
steps) condition and the baseline (mean: 8.10 steps), post-
experimental baseline (mean: 9.50 steps), and control (mean:
9.40 steps) conditions (with the same p values as found for the
analysis on seconds).
Figure 9 also shows the results for the four male
chimpanzees. In general, in all conditions, they waited
longer before they left the critical area than did female
chimpanzees and, unlike the females, showed fewer signs
of distinguishing between the conditions.
Discussion
This study provides converging evidence, using a different
methodology, for the findings of the first study. The chim-
panzees we tested, in particular the female chimpanzees,
Table 5 Mean latency to leave (in seconds) for each trial in Study 2
Sex Condition
Experimental Control Post-experimental baseline Baseline
WT AFC E2C DRC PB1 PB2 PB3 B1 B2 B3 B4
Both 8.2 5.8 7.7 6.7 7.6 5.8 7.2 5.7 6.0 6.2 5.7
Females 7.2 5.3 7.5 6.2 7.0 4.6 6.3 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.6
Males 10.8 7.2 8.1 7.9 9.1 8.6 9.3 7.7 8.1 8.7 6.2






































p  = .025
p  = .074
Fig. 8 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for seconds chimpanzees
waited before leaving the critical area at location A in Study 2 (For
baseline, post-experimental baseline, and experimental trials means




interpreted what the human experimenter was doing differ-
ently in the different conditions, even though her actions
were identical in all cases during the test phase. Indeed, in
two of the experimental conditions (the walkie-talkie and E2
calls conditions), the experimenter’s behavior was even
identical to that in the baseline condition before the test—the
only thing that differed was what happened in the environ-
ment. The use of concurrent behavioral cues was thus not
possible at any phase in these conditions.
One could argue that the chimpanzees could have been
using some learned context cues involving walkie-talkies
and the like. This seems unlikely, however. There exists
no specific information on the chimpanzees’ exact history
with these or similar situations in the past, but watching
one person stand up to go retrieve a clipboard that
another person has thrown too short is almost certainly
novel for all chimpanzees—clipboards are almost always
right next to the human or even in their laps. And
although they have seen humans answer walkie-talkies, it
is usually by retrieving it from their own belt or pocket.
Most importantly, in the control condition, the experi-
menter threw down her clipboard and stood up, but in
this case, the chimpanzees apparently saw things differ-
ently since she threw it down herself. So context here
cannot be defined as a clipboard on the ground because
they behaved differently if the experimenter threw it on
the ground herself or another human threw it (short) to
her. This condition also argues against the possibility that
the pure presence or distraction of an event occurring is
what made chimpanzees wait longer in the experimental
condition.
The key point is this. When the experimenter stood up
from her stool in the test phase, based on their past experience
in exactly the same physical context with exactly the same
experimenter, chimpanzees should have expected her to go
over to the other bucket of food (and indeed their behavior in
the pretest shows that they did come to expect this). However,
they did not: Instead, they changed their prediction of what
the experimenter was doing based on a novel event—one with
which they had limited if any experience in the current con-
text. In order to predict that the experimenter was doing
anything other than going to the other bucket of food, they
would have had to override recently learned behavioral rules
(the experimenter going to the food bucket) in favor of
something else. Our proposal for that something else would
be that they understood the experimenter’s new goal based on
a general understanding of the kinds of things that humans
want and find salient.
Another way of highlighting the difference between the
two kinds of explanation—concurrent behavioral cues
versus understanding goals—is this. In the current study,
the chimpanzees could have been predicting what the
human would do only on the basis of context. The question
is what we mean by context. Our proposal would be that it
does not mean something simple like the presence of a
particular object, or else there would have been no differ-
ence in performance in the experimental and control con-
ditions. What it means, in this case, is a problem facing the
human—an out-of-reach clipboard she wants, a far-away
walkie-talkie she must answer, or the beckoning of another
human she must respond to. Understanding the context not
in terms of surface features like objects but rather in terms
of problems for an actor means precisely understanding
that for her the current situation is not the desired situation,
and so her goal is to eliminate this discrepancy.
The fact that in this study, significant results were shown
mainly by the female chimpanzees is reminiscent of find-
ings of sex-based learning differences in chimpanzees in
the wild (Boesch-Achermann and Boesch 1993; Lonsdorf
2004, 2005). Female chimpanzees start to fish for termites
earlier in their ontogeny than male chimpanzees do, and
they are also more proficient at this skill after its acquisi-
tion than their male conspecifics, perhaps because they are
more attentive to their mothers’ performance in social
learning situations. It thus may be that females generally
pay more attention in feeding situations and/or are less
distractible than males and that gives them an advantage in
both these situations.
General discussion
In the current studies, we found that the great apes tested
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Fig. 9 Medians (?interquartile ranges) for seconds chimpanzees
waited before leaving the critical area at location A for the groups of
female and male chimpanzees separately in Study 2 (For baseline,
post-experimental baseline, and experimental trials means were




in different contexts. Our proposal is that they were using
these contexts to determine the human’s goal. Previous
studies have always compared situations in which the
human’s behavior was slightly different when he had one
goal rather than another—and so the apes could always
have been reacting to some kind of concurrent behavioral
cues. However, in the current studies, the use of such
behavioral cues was not possible during the test phase—or
at any time in some conditions in Study 2.
Still, as noted above, there could conceivably be an
analog to behavioral cues that we might call contextual
cues. The apes could have learned some kind of association
between specific contexts (behavioral cues that precede the
test phase) and an actor’s behavior. As with behavioral
cues, this has some plausibility in familiar, repetitive
contexts, but not in more novel contexts, and in the current
studies, we created novel contexts for the apes. Moreover,
the way these contextual cues might have worked was very
different in the two studies. In Study 1, we arranged things
so that if the apes were simply associating the human’s
previous behavior or events with outcomes, they should
have waited in anticipation for food equally long in both
conditions. A more plausible interpretation, therefore, is
that in the experimental condition, the apes simply saw the
experimenter as trying to open the box—which meant that
they should wait, which they did.
In the second study, we first led the apes to establish an
expectation that when the human stood up from her stool,
she was headed for the other food bucket. Thus, if the apes
predicted what the experimenter was likely to do based
only on her previous behavior, they should have predicted
this same sequence of events always and equally in all
conditions, but they did not. In the key conditions, they
took into account a unique event that had just happened:
someone threw the experimenter a clipboard (short), or
someone called the experimenter, or the experimenter’s
walkie-talkie made noise. On the basis of this unique
event—not previously experienced with this experimenter
in this situation—they now predicted that she would do
something different, because she now had a different goal.
Of course, it is possible that in their past experience, the
apes have seen someone retrieve a clipboard, and so they
are predicting that is what will happen now. However,
when the experimenter threw down her own clipboard, they
did not predict that she would retrieve it but rather thought
that now she would be going to the other bucket. Thus,
unlike Study 1 in which context was operationalized as
just-previous behavior, here context had something to do
with what was happening in the situation; in our interpre-
tation, given the results of the control condition in which
the experimenter threw down her own clipboard, context
really means a new goal-relevant possibility in the situation
for the human.
It is useful to recall here again two other studies that
may be interpreted as apes understanding others’ goals.
First, Warneken and colleagues (2006, 2007) found that
when a human had a problem such as an out-of-reach
object, chimpanzees sometimes helped her by retrieving it
for her, whereas they did not do this if she had thrown it
away. Second, Tomasello and Carpenter (2005), Buttel-
mann et al. (2007) both conducted studies in which
chimpanzees imitated human behavior, and they did so
differently depending on how they interpreted the human’s
goals and intentions. The point is that both of these sets of
studies have response measures—retrieving objects and
imitating—that are not easily explained as an outcome of
behavioral or contextual cues because the response is to
help or to imitate the human appropriately—not just to
anticipate.
One might wonder why some of our results are not
particularly strong. One possibility is that in both studies,
our apes might have thought they had some chance of
getting food in both conditions. In Study 1, even though the
experimenter did not previously have the goal of opening
boxes, she might be willing to do so and therefore waiting
in the critical area might be useful. In Study 2, it was not
very costly to walk over to the other food bucket, so apes
might have taken a chance and gone there just in case the
experimenter would give them some food there on her way
out of the room or when coming back after getting the
walkie-talkie. However, the main reason that the results
were not particularly strong is surely the relative ambiguity
of the situations: we deliberately stripped the situations of
all the typically present behavioral cues that could be used
to help infer the experimenter’s goal: gaze direction, facial
expressions, and effortful action. Without these cues, apes’
task is surely much more difficult and this is reflected in the
results.
All in all, it is difficult to imagine that the totality of ape
social interaction depends on their learning specific
behavioral and contextual cues for predicting what others
will do in every situation. It is difficult because, first, they
would have to learn probably thousands or tens-of-thou-
sands of such specific cues, maybe differently for different
individuals. Many of these cues would require learning
complex conditional discriminations between arbitrary
stimuli which, as Call (2007) has noted, chimpanzees learn
only with much difficulty or not at all. It is also difficult
because, second, those rules would be of no help in novel
situations—and apes seem to adapt immediately to novel
situations such as those in the current studies as well as in
previous studies. Of course, some learning is involved in
all of this. An individual can discern the particular goal of
another individual in a particular situation only on the basis
of some kind of behavioral or contextual cue. However, the
fact that some experience and/or learning is involved does
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not mean that the outcome is not an understanding of goals.
We think a very reasonable way to explain the apes’
behavior in the current study, and other studies of the same
and similar phenomena, is to credit them with an under-
standing of others as goal-directed agents who act when
and because the currently perceived situation does not
match their goal.
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